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In his Article, Professor Kirgis argues that the familiar practice of
judicial certification of expert witnesses lacks a foundation in law and
common-sense. Professor Kirgis complements his argument with a
discussion ofseveralpractical considerations that arise when a litigator
elects to challenge the judicial qualification of an opponent's expert
witness.
Introduction
[Y]ou say to the judge something like, "Your Honor, I ask the court to
declare Dr. Elko an expert in the field of physiology." ... And, of course,
you've done it, so the judge says, "Yes." How does the jury hear it? The
jury hears it as the judge certifying that your expert is an expert. Thejudge's
authority begins to be associated with your expert's authority. And since
the judge is the ultimate figure in the courtroom, it's a very nice phenomenon
to have working for you.'
The ritual of "qualifying" an expert through judicial designation be-
fore eliciting the expert's testimony has become an accepted feature of
most civil trials and of a growing number of criminal trials.2 Indeed, the
practice is so ingrained that not only do many lawyers expect the judge
to bless their own expert witnesses with an express "qualification," but
many lawyers also see a miscarriage of justice when the other side's
t B.A. (1989), Colgate University; J.D. (1994), Washington & Lee University School
of Law. The author is an Assistant Professor of Law at St. John's University School
of Law.
A version of this Article was published in the February 2000 edition of the New York
State Bar Journal. The Article is republished here with permission.
'Irving R. Younger, A PracticalApproach to the Use ofExpert Testimony, 31 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 1, 16 (1982).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434,1441 (7th Cir. 1996) (determin-
ing that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he designated the prosecution
witness an "expert witness").
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experts testify without such a blessing. Yet the kind of express expert
certifications advocated by Judge Younger and appearing so frequently
in trial transcripts are not required. They are, in fact, fundamentally at
odds with basic principles regarding the role of the judge in the court-
room. This Article argues that judges should refrain from expressly
certifying witnesses as experts and that attorneys should object when an
adversary requests such a certification.
The Article first describes the nature of expert testimony and explains
the foundation an attorney must lay to establish the relevance of expert
testimony. The Article then explains the fundamental problem with a
judge's express declaration that a witness is an expert. Finally, the Article
discusses some of the practical considerations that the lack of judicial
certification of expert witnesses implicates.
I. The Nature of Expert Testimony
Most evidence is relevant because it touches directly on the events
giving rise to the litigation. For example, testimony in a car accident case
about whether the light was red or green tells the factfinder something
about the circumstances surrounding the accident that makes it more or
less likely that one of the parties was at fault. By the same token, a
written contract tells the factfmder something about the actual agreement
between the parties that makes it more or less likely that a breach occur-
red. These items of evidence are admissible only if they are supported
by a foundation that establishes their relevance. For testimony, the
foundation is typically testimony by the witness that she has personal
knowledge of the subject matter of her testimony; in the car accident
example above, the foundation would consist of testimony that the wit-
ness was present at the scene of the accident and perceived the color of
the light.' For physical evidence, the foundation is some form of authen-
3See, e.g., United States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547,551-52(8th Cir. 1988) (appealing
the failure of a trial judge to expressly certify the other party's expert witness).
4 See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 2 (4th ed. 1998)
(stating that "the proponent of an item of evidence must ordinarily lay the foundation
before formally offering the item into evidence").
'Id. at 29.
[Vol. 24:347
CURTAILING JUDICIAL CERTIFICATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES
tication or, in legal parlance, evidence that the thing is what it purports
to be; for a contract it is likely to consist of testimony by a witness that
the contract offered in court is the one the parties signed.6
Expert testimony serves a different function and operates under
different foundational rules. Expert testimony typically consists of two
aspects that are seldom clearly delineated. First, an expert often acts as
a source ofbackground information for thejury. One assumes thatjurors
have a body of common knowledge that they use to make sense of the
data put before them at trial. Sometimes, however, an understanding of
the physical evidence introduced at trial requires specialized knowledge
not shared by the majority of people in society. An expert can serve as
an instructor, giving thejurors needed specialized knowledge so that they
can evaluate the evidence. At common law, a witness was allowed to
assume that role only when the subject of the testimony was "beyond the
ken" of an ordinary juror.7 The Federal Rules of Evidence lower the bar
to expert testimony by providing that a witness qualified as an expert may
testify to "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" as long
as that testimony "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue."8
Expert witnesses rarely stop after explaining the relevant background
knowledge. The second aspect of expert testimony typically involves the
expert drawing a conclusion about the facts in issue based on the evidence
in the case. Rule 702 specifically allows this step by providing that the
expert may testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 9 The expert's
opinion is admissible for the same reasons that lay opinions are generally
admissible: first, it will often be impossible or highly inefficient to con-
vey enough information to the jury to allow them to draw the desired
inference;'" second, experience proves that it is impossible to draw clear
6 Id. at 41.
7 See 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 53-54 (4th ed. 1992)
(stating that traditionally "the subject of [the expert's] inference mustbe so distinctively
related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of
laymen").
8 FED. R. EvD. 702.
9 Id.
'0 See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 701.2 (3d ed. 1998)
(describing the "collective facts" exception to the rule excluding opinion testimony).
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and consistent lines between "fact" and "opinion."" At common law,
experts were precluded from giving opinions touching on the "ultimate
issues" in the case.12 Rule 704 ensures wide latitude for expert opinions
by providing that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference other-
wise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue.,
13
Because the relevance of expert testimony is different from that of
other types of evidence, the foundation for expert testimony is also
different. The foundation for expert testimony consists of two interrelated
components. First, the expert must have sufficient expertise in the
relevant field to provide the needed background knowledge and related
opinions. Rule 702 codifies that requirement by providing that the
witness must be "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education."14 Second, the expert's testimony-including both
the background knowledge and the methods used to draw any infer-
ences-must pass the reliability standard imposed by the Supreme Court
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,15 which is now codified
in the amended Rule 702.16
Although these requirements are more stringent than the general
requirements of competency and authenticity required for other types of
evidence, they serve exactly the same basic function: They establish the
underlying relevance of the testimony. Just as a witness's testimony is
relevant only if the witness has personal knowledge, and a document is
relevant only if it is authentic, an expert's testimony is relevant-that is,
it is helpful to thejury-only if the witness has the requisite expertise and
" See FED. R. EVID. 701(b) advisory committee's note (describing "the practical
impossibility of determining by rule what is a 'fact"').
2 See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 10, § 704.2 (stating that "[c]ase law once pro-
vided that a question to any witness was objectionable if it called for his opinion on the
precise issue the jury was sworn to determine" (citations omitted)).
'1 FED. R. EvID. 704(a).
':FED. R. EVID. 702.
'5 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); see also Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999).
16 Rule 702 was amended as of December 1, 2000. It now provides that the expert
may testify only if "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702.
(Vol. 24:347
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her methods are sound. An attorney who elicits an expert witness's
credentials and methods is simply laying that foundation.
II. The Problem of Expert "Qualification"
A. Expert Certification Is Not Required
Imagine a trial lawyer eliciting that a witness was at the scene of the
accident and saw the color of the light and then saying to thejudge, "Your
honor, we ask at this time that the witness be designated as having
personal knowledge." The request seems absurd because, as every trial
lawyer knows, ajudge has no occasion to make rulings on the admissibil-
ity of evidence unless he is first presented with an objection. 17 Once the
foundation is laid, absent an objection, the questioning proceeds or the
document is admitted.
Testimony on specialized subject matters-that is, expert testimony-
should function under the same regime. To say that a witness is "quali-
fied as an expert" in a particular field is to say that she has the requisite
knowledge, skill, training, or education to give relevant testimony on the
proffered subject. In other words, the word "qualified" in Rule 702 is an
adjective; it is something a person either is or is not, rather than some-
thing that happens to a person in the form of ajudicial designation. Once
the required foundation is laid for an expert to testify, absent an objection,
the questioning of the expert should proceed. Until an objection is raised,
the court simply has nothing to rule on and hence has no reason to declare
the witness qualified.
In general, when judges have had occasion to consider this issue head
on, they have concluded that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not require
an express expert certification) That is an important step, but it does
17 See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 5 (3d ed.
1996) ("If, by careless omission or deliberate inaction, a party makes no objection to
admissible evidence, the evidence is admitted and becomes part ofthe material available
to the trier of fact.").
8 See, e.g., Berry v. City ofDetroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that,
"[a]lthough the practice is different in some state courts, the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not call for the proffer of an expert after he has stated his general qualifications"
(emphasis added)).
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not go far enough. Few courts or commentators have recognized the
inherent impropriety of ajudicial declaration that a witness is an "expert"
in the absence of an objection. 9
B. Expert Certification Is Improper
Imagine another courtroom colloquy: Instead of asking the judge to
designate a witness as having personal knowledge, counsel examines a
key witness and then, before sitting down, asks the judge to certify the
witness as "trustworthy." Opposing counsel would never allow such a
request to pass without objection. Whilejudges have inherent authority
to comment on the evidence,2" that authority does not extend to comments
on the credibility of witnesses.2 As the Supreme Court recognized over
sixty-five years ago:
In commenting upon testimony [the judge] may not assume the role of a
witness. He may analyze and dissect the evidence, but he may not either
distort it or add to it. His privilege of comment in order to give appropriate
assistance to the jury is too important to be left without safeguards against
abuses. The influence of the trial judge on the jury "is necessarily and
properly of great weight" and "his lightest word or intimation is received
with deference, and may prove controlling."2
Recognizing judges' power over juries, most litigators have a keen
sensitivity to the impact of comments from the bench. When it comes
to expert testimony, however, the lawyer's instinct for self-preservation
9 Judge Charles R. Richey of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia is a notable exception. See generally Charles R. Richey, Proposals to
Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word "Expert" under the Federal
Rules of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537 (1994) (arguing
that the term "expert" is so prejudicial it should never be used in a jury trial).
2See Supreme Court Standard 107.
21 See United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d 371, 372 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding the
defendant's right to have his credibility determined by ajury was violated by the judge's
statement that the defendant was "devoid of credibility").
22 Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470, 53 S. Ct. 698, 699, 77 L. Ed. 1321,
1327 (1933) (quoting Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626, 14 S. Ct. 919, 923, 38
L. Ed. 841, 846 (1894)).
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seems to evaporate. Most litigators fail to recognize the potentially
prejudicial impact of a solemn judicial declaration: that a witness hired
by the other side, who may be the key to the case, is an "expert" in his
field. Astonishingly, some attorneys go so far as to demand that kind of
judicial encomium for their adversaries.23
Simply put, no trial lawyer should allow the judge to declare that a
witness hired by the other party is an "expert" without objection.
Although judges are accustomed to making those certifications, when
faced with the issue directly they are likely to see the potential problems.
In United States v. Bartley, for example, the court held that
there is no requirement that the court specifically make that finding [that a
witness is qualified as an expert] in open court upon proffer of the offering
party. Such an offer and finding by the Court might influence the jury in
its evaluation of the expert and the better procedure is to avoid an acknowl-
edgment of the witnesses' expertise by the Court.24
Few other courts have addressed this precise question, and even Bartley
stops short of a clear condemnation. But the issue is too important to be
ignored, and most judges are likely to see the logic and fairness of the
Bartley court's opinion.
III. Practical Considerations
The absence of legal attacks on the practice of expert certification
probably stems from several sources. One reason many lawyers may
hesitate to address the qualification issue is because expert certification
is entrenched in litigators' and judges' routine practices. Judges who have
grown accustomed to certifying experts may look on an objection to the
procedure as a direct challenge. This is a real risk. Probably the best
approach, rather than raising the issue directly in open court, is to address
it at the pre-trial conference. Alternatively, if the request for "qualifica-
tion" comes up at trial, counsel should ask for a sidebar. Without the risk
of embarrassing the judge, counsel can then gently explain, in nonaccusa-
2 See United States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 551-52 (8th Cir. 1988) (appealing the
failure of a trial judge to expressly certify the other party's expert witness).
24 855 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1988).
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tory terms, that the express certification of an expert is neither required
nor allowed, given the proscription on commenting on the credibility of
witnesses.
Another concern may be that, absent an express "certification," it will
not be clear who is an expert. This can be an important consideration,
since experts are subject to separate discovery rules,25 and since an expert
opinion, unlike a lay opinion, may be based at least in part on inadmissi-
ble hearsay.26 Like the issue of the admissibility of the expert's testimony,
however, these issues are important only to the party opposing the expert.
If at some point that party sees a need to get a judicial ruling on the
expert's qualifications, counsel may interpose an objection. The mere
possibility of these issues arising does not warrant a preemptive judicial
declaration that an expert is qualified.
Since the natural breaking point provided by the proffer of the expert
will not occur, a party seeking to voir dire an expert witness will have to
take some affirmative steps to secure that opportunity. Again, to avoid
confusion, this issue should be discussed at the pretrial hearing. If
counsel chooses to object to the expert's testimony on the ground that the
expert is not qualified, either with or without voir dire, thejudge will have
to make a ruling. If the judge finds the expert is not qualified, then the
judge simply sustains the objection and the expert does not testify. If the
judge finds the expert is qualified, the judge must, at a minimum, overrule
the objection. Many judges may also be inclined to declare the expert
qualified at that point. While an express certification under those
circumstances seems less prejudicial than such a declaration made without
a prior objection, the better practice is to avoid any appearance of
commenting on the credibility of the witness by simply overruling the
objection and allowing the witness to testify.
Conclusion
Given the importance of expert testimony in modem litigation,
litigators should not be as blas6 about thejudicial certification of experts
as they traditionally have been. When entire cases rise or fall on highly
25 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(2) & (b)(4).
26See FED. R. EvID. 703.
[Vol. 24:347
2000] CURTAILING JUDICIAL CERTIFICATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES 355
technical, sophisticated testimony, a simple declaration by a judge that
a witness is an "expert" can have a profound impact. But few lawyers
even recognize the danger, much less take steps to protect themselves and
their clients. Established practices can be difficult to dislodge, but courts
generally have perceived the problem when faced with it directly. With
a little foresight and tact, the savvy litigator can remove at least this one
arrow from his opponent's quiver.

